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Abstract—Hypothesis testing is a statistical inference frame-
work for determining the true distribution among a set of possible
distributions for a given dataset. Privacy restrictions may require
the curator of the data or the respondents themselves to share
data with the test only after applying a randomizing privacy
mechanism. This work considers mutual information (MI) as the
privacy metric for measuring leakage. In addition, motivated by
the Chernoff-Stein lemma, the relative entropy between pairs of
distributions of the output (generated by the privacy mechanism)
is chosen as the utility metric. For these metrics, the goal
is to find the optimal privacy-utility trade-off (PUT) and the
corresponding optimal privacy mechanism for both binary and
m-ary hypothesis testing. Focusing on the high privacy regime,
Euclidean information-theoretic approximations of the binary
and m-ary PUT problems are developed. The solutions for the
approximation problems clarify that an MI-based privacy metric
preserves the privacy of the source symbols in inverse proportion
to their likelihoods.
Index Terms—Hypothesis testing, privacy-guaranteed data
publishing, privacy mechanism, Euclidean information theory,
relative entropy, Re´nyi divergence, mutual information.
I. INTRODUCTION
There is tremendous value to publishing datasets for a vari-
ety of statistical inference applications; however, it is crucial
to ensure that the published dataset, while providing utility,
does not reveal potentially privacy-threatening information.
Specifically, the published dataset should allow the intended
inference to be made while limiting other unwanted inferences.
This requires using a randomizing mechanism (i.e., a noisy
channel) that guarantees a certain measure of privacy. Any
such privacy mechanism may, in turn, reduce the fidelity of
the intended inference leading to a trade-off between utility of
the published data and the privacy of the respondents in the
dataset.
We consider the problem of privacy-guaranteed data pub-
lishing hypothesis testing. The use of large datasets to test
two or more hypotheses (e.g., the 99%-1% theory of income
distribution in the United States [1]) relies on the classical
statistical inference framework of binary or multiple hypoth-
esis testing. The optimal test for hypothesis testing under
various scenarios (non-Bayesian, Bayesian, minimax) involves
the so-called Neyman-Pearson (or likelihood ratio) test [2] in
which the likelihood ratio of the hypotheses is compared to
a given threshold. We focus exclusively on the non-Bayesian
setting. In particular, for m-ary (m ≥ 2) hypothesis testing
problem, we consider the setting in which the probability
of missed detection is minimized for one specific hypothesis
(e.g., presence of cancer) while requiring the probabilities of
This work is supported in part by the National Science Foundation under
grants CCF-1350914 and CIF-1422358.
false alarm for the same hypothesis to be bounded (relative
to the remaining hypotheses). In this context, we can apply
the Chernoff-Stein Lemma [3, Chapter 11] which states that
for a pair of hypotheses the largest error exponent of the
missed detection probability, under the constraint that the
false alarm probability is bounded above by a constant, is the
relative entropy between the probability distributions for the
two hypotheses.
Inspired by the Chernoff-Stein lemma, for the m-ary hy-
pothesis setting described above, we use relative entropy as a
measure of the utility of the published dataset (for hypothesis
testing), and henceforth, refer to this as the relative entropy
setting. Furthermore, for binary hypothesis testing (m = 2),
we also consider the setting in which the probabilities of both
missed detection and false alarm decrease exponentially. For
this setting, using known results of hypothesis testing [4], we
take the Re´nyi divergence as the utility metric and refer to this
as the Re´nyi divergence setting. For the privacy metric, we
use mutual information between the original and published
datasets as a measure of the additional knowledge (privacy
leakage) gained on average from the published dataset. By
bounding the MI leakages, our goal is to develop privacy
mechanisms that restrict the relative entropy between the prior
and posterior (after publishing) distributions of the dataset,
averaged over the published dataset. By restricting the distance
between prior and posterior beliefs, we capture a large class of
computationally unbounded adversaries that can use different
inference methods. Specifically, bounding MI leakage allows
us to exploit information-theoretic relationships between MI
and the probabilities of detection/estimation to bound the
ability of an adversary to “learn” the original dataset [3], [5],
[6].
A. Our Contributions
We study the privacy-preserving data publishing problem
by considering a local privacy model in which the same
(memoryless) mechanism is applied independently to each
entry of the dataset. This allows the respondents of a dataset
to apply the privacy mechanism before sharing data. Our main
contributions are as follows:
1) We introduce the privacy-utility trade-off (PUT) problem
for hypothesis testing (Section II). The resulting PUT
involves maximizing the minimum of a set of relative
entropies, subject to constraints on the MI- based leak-
ages for all source classes.
2) The PUT problem involves maximizing the minimum
of a set of convex functions over a convex set which is,
in general, NP-hard. In Section III, we approximate the
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2trade-off in the high privacy regime (near zero leakage)
using techniques from Euclidean information theory (E-
IT); these techniques have found use in deriving capacity
results in [7], [8].
3) For binary hypothesis testing, we first consider the
relative entropy setting (Section IV-A), in which we
determine the optimal mechanism in closed form for the
E-IT approximation by exploring the problem structure.
Our results suggest that the solution to the E-IT approx-
imation is independent of the alphabet size and, more
importantly, that a MI-based privacy metric preserves
the privacy of the source symbols inversely proportional
to their likelihoods, thereby, providing more distortion
to the (informative) outliers in the dataset which, in
general, are more vulnerable to detection.
4) We extend our analysis to the Re´nyi divergence setting
(Section IV-B), the optimal mechanism for its E-IT
approximation problem in high privacy regime is similar
in form to the relative entropy setting.
5) We study the m-ary hypothesis testing problem (Section
V) and show that optimal solutions of the E-IT ap-
proximation can be obtained via semidefinite programs
(SDPs) [9]. Specially, for binary sources the optimal
mechanism is derived in closed form. The dependence
on the source distribution is highlighted here as well.
6) In Section VI, via numerical simulations, we uncover
regimes of distribution tuples and leakage values for
which the E-IT approximation is accurate.
B. Related Work
Privacy-guaranteed hypothesis testing in the high privacy
regime using MI as the privacy metric was first studied by
the authors in [10]. Specifically, the focus of [10] is on the
relative entropy setting of binary hypothesis test in the high
privacy regime. We significantly extend that work with three
key contributions: (a) we derive optimal mechanisms in the
high privacy regime for binary hypothesis test in the Re´nyi
divergence setting; (b) we derive optimal mechanisms in the
high privacy regime for the m-ary problem in relative entropy
setting; (c) we provide detailed illustrations of results for
binary and m-ary hypothesis testing.
Recently, the problem of designing privacy mechanisms for
hypothesis testing has gained interest. Kairouz et al. [11] show
that the optimal locally differential privacy (L-DP) mechanism
has a staircase form and can be obtained as a solution of
a linear program. Gaboardi et al. [12] deal with a privacy-
guaranteed hypothesis testing by using chi-square goodness
of fit as the utility measure and adding Gaussian or Laplace
noise to dataset to guarantee DP-based privacy protection.
Our problem differs from these efforts in using MI as the
privacy metrics. In [11], the L-DP formulation, focused on
the high privacy regime, requires the mechanism to limit
distinction between any two letters of the source alphabet
for a given output. The requirement also gathers all privacy
mechanisms satisfying a desired privacy protection measured
by L-DP within a hypercube. Therefore, the authors simplify
the trade-off problem to a linear program by exploring the
sub-linearity of the relative entropy function. In contrast,
all privacy mechanisms giving a desired MI-based privacy
form a convex set which is not a polytope. However, taking
advantage of E-IT, we propose good approximations for the
MI-based privacy utility trade-offs in high privacy regime.
In fact, we present closed-form privacy mechanisms for both
binary hypothesis testing with arbitrary alphabets as well as
m-ary hypothesis testing with binary alphabets. Furthermore,
for m-ary hypothesis testing with arbitrary sources, the privacy
mechanism can be attained effectively by solving an SDP.
The connection between hypothesis testing and privacy
has been studied in the context of location anonymization
and smart meter privacy. In location privacy, the problem of
determining if a sequence of anonymized data points (e.g.
location positions without an accompanying user ID) belongs
to a target user can be formulated as a hypothesis test. More
specifically, if the distribution of the user’s data is known
and unique among other users, any observed sequence can be
tested against the hypothesis that it was drawn from this dis-
tribution, thus revealing if it belongs to the target user. Within
this context, Montazeri et al. [13], [14] studied the problem of
anonymizing sequences of location data, and characterized the
probability of correctly guessing a target user’s data within a
larger dataset. In related work on smart meter privacy, Li and
Oechtering [15] considered the problem of private information
leakage in a smart grid. Here, an adversary challenges a
consumer’s privacy by performing an unauthorized binary
hypothesis test on the consumer’s behavior based on smart
meter readings. Li and Oechtering [15] propose a solution
for mitigating the incurred privacy risk with the assist of an
alternative energy source.
The theoretical analysis done by Montazeri et al. [13], [14]
and Li and Oechtering [15] are related to the one presented
here in that they also make use of large deviation (information-
theoretic) results in hypothesis testing. However, we apply
these powerful theoretical tools to a different setting, in which
data is purposefully randomized before disclosure in order
to provide privacy, while guaranteeing utility in terms of a
successful hypothesis test. Whereas they consider a hypothesis
testing adversary, here we consider a precise hypothesis test
as part of the utility metric.
MI has been amply used as a measure for quantifying
information leakage within the information-theoretic privacy
literature (cf. [5], [16]–[21] and the references therein). The
connection between MI-based metrics and other privacy met-
rics has been studied, for example, by Makhdoumi and Fawaz
[22]. In the present paper, we approximate MI by the chi-
squared divergence which, in turn, also posses interesting
estimation-theoretic properties [23]. An exploration of the role
of chi-squared related metrics in privacy has appeared in the
work of Asoodeh et al. [24], [25].
C. Notation
We use bold capital letters to represent matrices, e.g., X is a
matrix with the ith row (or column) being Xi and the (i, j)th
entry Xij . We use bold lower case letters to represent vectors,
e.g. x is a vector with the ith entry xi. Sets are denoted by
capital calligraphic letters.
3For vectors a and b, and functions f and g,
[ f(a)
g(b)
]
is a
diagonal matrix with the ith diagonal entry being f(ai)g(bi) , e.g.,
the diagonal matrix [ a
2√
b
] has diagonal entries a
2
i√
bi
. We denote
the l2-norm of a vector x by ‖x‖, the logarithm of x to the
base 2 as log x. Probability mass functions are denoted as row
vectors, e.g., p. In addition, D(·‖·) denotes the relative entropy
and I(·; ·) denotes the MI. We can write the MI between two
random variables or between a probability distribution and the
corresponding conditional probability matrix. Indeed, for two
random variables X, X¯ with X ∼ p and X¯|{X = x} ∼
WX¯|X=x, the MI is denoted as I(X; X¯) or I(p,WX¯|X).
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. General Hypothesis Testing
We consider an m-ary hypothesis testing problem that
distinguishes between m ≥ 2 explanations for an observed
dataset. Let Xn = (X1, . . . , Xn) denote a sequence of n ran-
dom variables, where the entries Xi are drawn independently
according to a probability distribution p. The observed random
variables are assumed to be discrete with alphabet X and size
|X | = M . The m hypotheses are denoted as Hk : p = pk for
k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Our utility goal is to make a decision about
the underlying distribution of the data Xn. Let the disjoint
decision regions be A(n)k . This means that if Xn belongs to
A(n)k , we decide in favor of Hk.
B. Binary Hypothesis Testing
In binary hypothesis testing, there are only two hypotheses:
H1 : p = p1 and H2 : p = p2. The optimum test is
the Neyman-Pearson test in which the decision region for
hypothesis H1 is A(n)1 =
{
xn : p1(x
n)
p2(xn)
> T
}
for some
threshold T ∈ R. Let β(n)1 and β(n)2 be the probabilities of false
alarm and missed detection for H1, respectively. Use β
(n)
2 (δ)
to indicate the smallest probability of the missed detection
subject to the condition that β(n)1 ≤ δ. The Chernoff-Stein
lemma [3, Chap. 11] states that
lim
n→∞−
1
n
log β
(n)
2 (δ) = D(p2‖p1), ∀ δ ∈ (0, 1). (1)
Hence, we use D(p2‖p1) as our utility function.
C. m-ary Hypothesis Testing
In m-ary hypothesis testing, there are m(m − 1) different
errors resulting from mistaking hypothesis Hi for Hj , i 6= j.
To keep our analysis simple, we consider a scenario somewhat
analogous to the “red alert” [26] problem in “unequal error
protection” [27]. There is one distinguished hypothesis H1
whose inference takes precedence. For example, in practice
p1 could be the underlying distribution of measurements of
a malignant tumor; the other distributions p2, . . . ,pk could
be the underlying distributions of measurements of various
benign tumors. We would like to minimize the miss-detection
rate of H1. In this scenario, we would design the decision
regions {A(n)k }mk=1 to maximize the minimum of E1,k over
k ∈ {2, . . . ,m}, where E1,k is the error exponent (exponential
rate of decay of the error probability analogous to (1)) of
mistaking Hk when H1 is true.
D. Privacy Considerations
In most data collection and classification applications, there
may be an additional requirement to ensure that the dataset,
while providing utility, does not leak information about the
respondents of the data. This in turn implies that the data
provided to the hypothesis test is not the same as the original
data, but instead a randomized version that guarantees precise
measures of privacy (information leakage) and utility. Specif-
ically, we use MI as a measure of the average information
leakage between the input dataset and its randomized output
dataset that is used by the test. The goal is to find the random-
izing mapping, henceforth referred to a privacy mechanism,
such that a measure of utility of the data is maximized while
ensuring that the MI-based leakages for all possible source
classes are bounded.
We assume that the entries of the dataset are generated in
an i.i.d. fashion. Focusing on the local privacy model, the
randomizing privacy mechanism for the hypothesis testing
problem is memoryless. Let W, an M × N conditional
probability matrix, denote this memoryless privacy mechanism
which maps the M letters of the input alphabet X to N letters
of the output alphabet Xˆ , where N ≥ 2 is an arbitrary finite
integer. Thus, the i.i.d. sequence Xn ∼ pk, k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, is
mapped to an output sequence Xˆn whose entries Xˆj ∈ Xˆ for
all j ∈ {1, . . . , N} are i.i.d. with the distribution pkW. Thus,
the hypothesis test is now performed on a sequence Xˆn that
belongs to one of m source classes with distributions1 pkW.
For the m-ary setting, the error exponent, corresponding to the
missed detection of H1 as Hk, is D(pkW‖p1W).
E. The Privacy-Utility Trade-off
To design an appropriate privacy mechanism, we wish
to maximize the minimum of the m − 1 error exponents
D(pkW‖p1W) subject to the following leakage constraints:
I(pk,W) ≤ k for k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Formally, the privacy-
utility trade-off (PUT) problem is that finding the optimal
privacy mechanism W∗ of the following optimization:
max
W∈W
min
k=2,...,m
D(pkW‖p1W)
s.t. I(pk,W) ≤ k k = 1, 2, . . . ,m
(2)
where W is the set of M × N row stochastic matrices, and
k ∈ [0, H(pk)], k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, are permissible upper
bounds on I(pk,W). The optimization in (2) maximizes the
minimum of m− 1 convex functions over a convex set. Since
the maximum of each of the m − 1 convex functions are
attained on the boundary of the feasible region, the optimal
solution of the optimization is also on the boundary. Because
of the MI constraints, the feasible region is, in general, not a
polytope, and thus, has infinitely many extremal points. While
there exist computationally tractable methods to obtain a so-
lution by approximating the feasible region by an intersection
of polytopes [28], our focus is on developing a principled
approximation for (2) in a specific privacy regime to obtain a
closed-from and easily-interpretable privacy mechanism.
1We remind that the distribution pW is the output distribution induced by
the input (row vector) p and the privacy mechanism (transition matrix) W.
4Specifically, we will work in the high privacy regime in
which k is small. In this regime, one can use Taylor series
expansions to approximate both the objective function and
the constraints. Such approximations were considered in [7],
[29]. More recently, analyses based on such approximations,
referred to as E-IT, have been found to be useful in a
variety settings from graphical model learning [30] to network
information theory problems [7] [8].
III. APPROXIMATIONS IN THE HIGH PRIVACY REGIME
In this section, we develop E-IT approximations of the rela-
tive entropy D(pkW‖p1W) and the MI I(pk,W) functions,
based on which we propose an approximation of PUT in (2)
in the high privacy regime.
To develop an approximation, we select an operating point
which will be perturbed to provide an approximately-optimal
privacy mechanism. We let k ∈ [0, ∗] for all k where ∗ 
min{H(pk), k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}}. Since our focus is on the high
privacy regime, we present the approximation around a perfect
privacy operation point, i.e., a privacy mechanism W0 that
achieves k = 0 for all k.
Lemma 1. For perfect privacy, i.e., k = 0 for all k ∈
{1, . . . ,m}, the privacy mechanism W0 is a rank-1 row
stochastic matrix with every row being equal to a row vector
w0 where w0 belongs to probability simplex, such that the
entries w0j , j ∈ {1, . . . , N} of the vector w0 satisfy
N∑
j=1
w0j = 1, and (3)
w0j ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , N}. (4)
Proof. For any probability distribution p with entries pi, i ∈
{1, . . . ,M}, and a privacy mechanism W,
I(p,W) =
M∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
piWij log
Wij∑M
i=1 piWij
(5)
≥
M∑
i=1
pi
( N∑
j=1
Wij
)
log
∑N
j=1Wij∑N
j=1
∑M
i=1 piWij
(6)
=
M∑
i=1
pi
N∑
j=1
Wij log
1
1
= 0 (7)
where (6) results from the log-sum inequality. Equality in (6)
holds if and only if [3, Theorem 2.7.1]
Wij =
M∑
k=1
pkWkj , i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, j ∈ {1, . . . , N}. (8)
In other words, perfect privacy, i.e., zero leakage, is achieved
when every row of the optimal mechanism W0 is the same
and is equal to the probability distribution w0 = pW0.
Thus, for the perfect privacy setting, the optimal mechanism
satisfying (8) does not rely on the input distribution.
Remark 1. Note that, for any W0 satisfying (8) that achieves
perfect privacy, the utility is D(pkW0‖p1W0) = 0 for all
k ∈ {2, . . . ,m}. Furthermore, the rows of W0, i.e., w0, can
take any value in an N -dimensional probability simplex.
The following proposition presents a E-IT approximation
for the objective and constraint functions of the optimization
in (2), i.e., the relative entropy D(pkW‖p1W) and MI
I(pk,W). This approximation is only applicable to the high
privacy regime in which the privacy mechanism W is modeled
as a perturbation of a W0 per Lemma 1.
Proposition 1. In the high privacy regime with 0 ≤ k 
min{H(pk), k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}}, the privacy mechanism W
is chosen as a perturbation of a perfect privacy (k =
0 for all k) achieving mechanism W0, i.e., W = W0 + Θ.
The mechanism W0 is a rank-1 row stochastic matrix with
every row being equal to a row vector w0 whose entries w0j
satisfy
∑N
j=1 w0j = 1 and w0j > 0, for all j ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
The perturbation matrix Θ is an M ×N matrix with entries
Θij satisfying
∑N
j=1 Θij = 0 and |Θij | ≤ ρw0j , for all
i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, j ∈ {1, . . . , N}. For this perturbation model,
the relative entropy D(pkW‖p1W) for all k ∈ {2, . . . ,m}
in the objective function, and the MI I(pk,W) for all k ∈
{1, . . . ,m} in the constraints of (2) can be approximated as
D(pkW‖p1W) ≈ 1
2
∥∥(pk − p1)Θ[(w0)− 12 ]∥∥2 (9)
I(pk,W) ≈ 1
2
M∑
i=1
p2i
∥∥Θi[(w0)− 12 ]∥∥2 (10)
where pki, for k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, is the ith entry of pk, Θi is
the ith row of Θ, and [(w0)−
1
2 ] is a diagonal matrix with ith
diagonal entry, for all i, being (w0i)−
1
2 . For ease of analysis,
setting A = Θ[(w0)−
1
2 ], (9) and (10) can be rewritten as
D(pkW‖p1W) ≈ 1
2
‖(pk − p1)A‖2 (11)
I(pk,W) ≈ 1
2
M∑
i=1
pki‖Ai‖2 (12)
In (9) and (11), the notation ≈ means that the difference
between the left and right sides is o(‖pk−p1‖2∞). Similarly, in
(10) amd (12), ≈ means that the two sides differ by o(‖Θ‖2∞).
Note that in Proposition 1, w0 is in the interior of the
probability simplex, i.e., w0 > 0. The approximation results
from the observation that all rows of a privacy mechanism
W in the high privacy (low leakage) regime are very close
to each other and both the relative entropy and MI can be
approximated by the χ2 divergence. The detailed proof is in
Appendix A.
IV. BINARY HYPOTHESIS TESTING IN THE HIGH PRIVACY
REGIME
For binary hypothesis testing, there are only two hypotheses
H1 : p = p1 and H2 : p = p2, and therefore, only two types
of errors. In this section, we consider the simplest hypothesis
testing scenario under two regimes. First, we regard one of
the two hypotheses (e.g., H1) as being more important than
the other. In this case, the goal is to maximize the exponent
of the missed detection for H1 subject to an upper bound
5on its false alarm probability. Second, both hypotheses are
important and the goal is to maximize a weighted sum of the
two exponents of the false alarm and missed detection. For
both cases, we derive the PUTs in the high privacy regime
and provide methods to attain explicit privacy mechanisms.
A. Binary Hypothesis Testing (Relative Entropy Setting)
We consider the case in which the false alarm of H1 is
bounded by a fixed positive constant and we examine the
fastest rate of decay of its missed detection. This is exactly the
problem formulated in Section II, and the PUT in (2) becomes
max
W∈W
D(p2W‖p1W)
s.t. I(pk,W) ≤ k k = 1, 2
(13)
where W is the set of all M ×N row stochastic matrices, and
k ∈ [0, H(pk)], are the permissible upper bounds of the pri-
vacy leakages for the two distributions p1 and p2, respectively.
Using the approximations in Proposition 1, the PUT for the
E-IT approximation problem in the high privacy regime with
0 ≤ k  min(H(p1), H(p2)), for all k ∈ {1, 2}, is
max
A
1
2
(p2 − p1)AAT (p2 − p1)T (14a)
s.t.
1
2
M∑
i=1
pki‖Ai‖2 ≤ k k = 1, 2 (14b)
A(
√
w0)
T = 0. (14c)
where Ai is the i-th row of the M ×N matrix A, w0 is an
interior point of the N -dimensional probability simplex, and√
w0 is a row vector with the ith entry being the squared root
of the ith entry of w0, i.e.,
√
w0,i.
Remark 2. The functions in (14a) and (14b) are the E-
IT approximations as presented in Proposition 1, and the
constraint (14c) results from the requirement that W is row
stochastic. This constraint is the only one in (14) that explicitly
involves the size of the output alphabet, i.e., the length of w0.
Theorem 1. The optimization problem in (14) reduces to one
with a vector variable a ∈ RM as
max
a
1
2
‖a(p2 − p1)T ‖2
s.t.
1
2
a[pk]a
T ≤ k k = 1, 2
(15)
where the absolute value of the ith entry ai of a, for all i ∈
{1, ..,M}, is the Euclidean norm of the ith row Ai of A.
The M × N matrix A∗ optimizing (14) is obtained from the
optimal solution a∗ of (15) as a rank-1 matrix whose ith row,
for all i, is given by a∗iv where a
∗
i is the i
th entry of a∗, and
v is a unit-norm N -dimensional vector that is orthogonal to
the non-zero-entry vector
√
w0, such that
A∗ = (a∗)Tv (16)
v(
√
w0)
T = 0 (17)
‖v‖ = 1. (18)
Finally, it suffices to restrict the output to a binary alphabet,
i.e., N = 2.
The proof of Theorem 1 is in Appendix B. We briefly
summarize the approach. The simplification of (14) to a vector
optimization in (15) results from the observation that the
privacy constraint (14b) only restricts the row-norms of the
matrix variable A, whereas A affects the objective (14a)
through all inner products of rows in A. By exploiting this spe-
cial structure, we simplify (14) to a quadratically constrained
quadratic program (QCQP) with a vector variable a which
governs the Euclidean norms of the rows in A. The optimal
A∗ is then given by (16) such that the row vector v is chosen
to satisfy (14c). Since (17) can be satisfied by a 2-dimensional
v, we conclude that a binary output alphabet suffices.
Note that the objective function and constraints of the
QCQP in (15) are “even” functions, i.e., if a is feasible, so
is its negation −a and both of them yield the same objective
value. Using this observation, we derive a convex program by
removing the square in the objective function. The following
theorem provides a closed-form privacy mechanism for the
PUT (14) in high privacy regime by using the Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker (KKT) conditions for convex programs.
Theorem 2. An optimal privacy mechanism W′ for the
approximation problem in (14) is
W′ = W0 + (a∗)Tv ·
[√
w0
]
(19)
where W0 is given by Proposition 1, v is chosen to satisfy (17)
and (18), and for λp = ‖p2−p1‖2 and vp = p2−p1‖p2−p1‖ being
the eigenvalue and eigenvector of (p2 − p1)T (p2 − p1), the
optimal solution of (15), namely a∗, is given as:
1) if only the first constraint in (15) is active,
vp
[
p2
(p1)2
]
(vp)
T
vp
[
(p1)−1
]
(vp)T
<
2
1
, (20)
and the optimal solution a∗ is
a∗ = ±
√
21
vp
[
(p1)−1
]
(vp)T
vp
[
(p1)
−1]; (21)
2) if only the second constraint in (15) is active,
vp
[
p1
(p2)2
]
(vp)
T
vp
[
(p2)−1
]
(vp)T
<
1
2
, (22)
and the optimal solution a∗ is
a∗ = ±
√
22
vp
[
(p2)−1
]
(vp)T
vp
[
(p2)
−1]; (23)
3) when both constraints in (15) are active, the optimal
solution a∗ is
a∗ = ±λp
2
vp
(
η∗1
[
p1
]
+ η∗2
[
p2
])−1
(24)
where η∗1 > 0 and η
∗
2 > 0 satisfy
vp
[
p1
](
η∗1
[
p1
]
+ η∗2
[
p2
])−2
(vp)
T =
81
(λp)2
(25)
6Fig. 1: Illustration of (19). The “nominal” row vector w0 is
perturbed in different directions depending on a∗ and v.
vp
[
p2
](
η∗1
[
p1
]
+ η∗2
[
p2
])−2
(vp)
T =
82
(λp)2
. (26)
The proof of Theorem 2 involves proving two lemmas and
is developed in Appendix C.
Remark 3. The optimal mechanism W′ = W0 +
(a∗)Tv
[√
w0
]
captures the fact that a statistical privacy
metric, such as MI, takes into consideration the source dis-
tribution in designing the perturbation mechanism Θ∗. In
fact, the solutions for a∗ in (21), (23) and (24) quantify
this through the term
(
η∗1 [p1] + η
∗
2 [p2]
)−1
. The vector vp
indicates the direction along which the objective function, i.e.,
the relative entropy, grows the fastest. In Fig. 1 we illustrate
the results of Theorem 2. Thus, for a uniformly distributed
source, all entries of vp have the same scaling such that
a∗ is in the direction of vp. However, for a non-uniform
source, the samples with low probabilities affect the direction
of vp
(
η∗1 [p1] + η
∗
2 [p2]
)−1
the most. This is a consequence of
the statistical leakage metric (the MI) which causes the optimal
mechanism to minimize information leakage by perturbing the
low probability (more informative) symbols proportionately
more relative to the higher probability ones.
B. Binary Hypothesis Testing (Re´nyi Divergence Setting)
We now consider the scenario in which both the false alarm
and missed detection probabilities for H1 are exponentially
decreasing. For this case, the trade-off between the two error
probabilities is captured by the Re´nyi divergence as shown in
[4], [31]. We use this as our utility metric and briefly review
the results in [4], [31] as a starting point.
Assume that the false alarm probability decays as
exp(−nE2,1), for some exponent E2,1 > 0. Then, the largest
error exponent of the missed detection E1,2 for a fixed E2,1
is a function of E2,1 given by [31]
E1,2(E2,1) , min
p:D(p‖p2)≤E2,1
D(p‖p1). (27)
Since (27) is a convex program, it can be equivalently char-
acterized by the Lagrangian minimization
L(β) , min
p
{D(p‖p1) + βD(p‖p2)}, (28)
leading to the dual problem [31]
E1,2(E2,1) = sup
β≥0
{L(β)− βE2,1} . (29)
The p∗ optimizing (28) can be computed using the KKT
conditions of (27) (cf. [4, (15)]) to further obtain
L(β) = −(1 + β) log
(∑
x
p1(x)
1
1+β p2(x)
β
1+β
)
. (30)
For α , β1+β ∈ (0, 1), (30) simplifies as [4]
1
α−1 log
(∑
x
p2(x)
αp1(x)
1−α
)
=Dα(p2‖p1) (31)
where Dα(p2‖p1) is the order-α Re´nyi divergence. From (28)
and (29), we see that Dα(p2‖p1) is the weighted sum of the
two error exponents, i.e., E1,2(E2,1) + α1−αE2,1, and as such
a good candidate for a utility metric in this setting. For this
metric, one can write the PUT problem as
max
W∈W
Dα(p2W‖p1W)
s.t. I(pk,W) ≤ k, k = 1, 2.
(32)
Analogous to the PUT in (13) with relative entropy as the
utility metric, the optimization in (32) is non-convex and
NP-hard. Thus, we focus on the high privacy regime and
approximate the order-α Re´nyi divergence in that regime. To
this end, we use the following lemma to explicitly present the
relationship of the order-α Re´nyi divergence Dα(p2‖p1) and
the relative entropy D(p2‖p1) when p2 and p1 are “close”.
Lemma 2. For α ∈ (0, 1), the following continuity statement
holds: If 2 p2 → p1, then
(1− α)D(p2‖p1)
2(1−α)Dα(p2‖p1) − 1 →
log e
α
. (33)
The proof is detailed in Appendix D.
According to Proposition 1, any privacy mechanism W
in the high privacy regime is a perturbation of a perfect
privacy mechanism W0. When k in (32) is close to zero,
ρ is also close to 0 and both output distributions p1W and
p2W approach w0. We now use Lemma 2 in the following
corollary to show that the ratio of (1−α)D(p2W‖p1W) and
2(1−α)Dα(p2W‖p1W)− 1 converges to the constant α−1 log e.
Corollary 1. Let α ∈ (0, 1). In (32), if 1, 2 → 0, W
converges to a perfect privacy mechanism W0 (cf. Lemma 1).
Consequently, p2W → p1W and the following convergence
statement also holds.
(1− α)D(p2W‖p1W)
2(1−α)Dα(p2W‖p1W) − 1 →
log e
α
. (34)
From (34), we observe that as 1, 2 → 0, Dα(p2W‖p1W )
is monotonically increasing in D(p2W‖p1W ). Thus, in this
high privacy regime, the optimizer of Dα(p2W‖p1W ) is the
same as D(p2W‖p1W ). As a result, in the high privacy
regime we revert to the relative entropy setting, for which
we provide a closed-form solution in Theorem 2.
V. m-ARY HYPOTHESIS TESTING IN THE HIGH PRIVACY
REGIME
We now consider the m-ary hypothesis testing problem
with m distinct hypotheses Hk, k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, each
2We say that a vector p2 converges to another vector p1, denoted as p2 →
p1, if ‖p2 − p1‖∞ → 0.
7corresponding to a distribution pk. This in turn results in
m(m−1) error probabilities of incorrectly inferring hypothesis
Hi as hypothesis Hj . As stated in Section II, to simplify our
analysis, we consider a scenario somewhat analogous to the
“red alert” [26] problem in “unequal error protection” [27],
i.e., there is one distinct hypothesis H1, the inference of which
is more crucial than that of others (e.g., presence of cancer).
We focus on maximizing the minimum of the m − 1 error
exponents corresponding to the m − 1 ways of incorrectly
deciding H1 as Hj , j 6= 1.
For this problem of unequal m-ary hypothesis testing, we
introduce the PUT in (2). We can further simplify the trade-off
in the high privacy regime using Proposition 1 to obtain the
following PUT:
max
A
min
{1
2
‖(pk − p1)A‖2, k = 2, . . . ,m
}
(35a)
s.t.
1
2
M∑
i=1
pki‖Ai‖2 ≤ k k = 1, 2, . . . ,m (35b)
A(
√
w0)
T = 0. (35c)
Recall that A ∈ RM×N is a perturbation matrix such
that the privacy mechanism W is related to W0 as
W = W0 + A[
√
w0], and Ai is the ith row of A.
For ease of analysis, we start from a simplified version of
(35) without the constraint (35c), which can be transformed to
a semi-definite program (SDP) as summarized in the following
lemma. Based on an optimal solution of the SDP, a scheme
is proposed for constructing an optimal solution A∗ of (35)
satisfying (35c).
Lemma 3. The optimization in (35a) with constraint (35b) is
equivalent to an SDP with (M ×M matrix) variable B =
AAT given as
max
B,t
t
s.t.
1
2
Tr
(
(pk − p1)T (pk − p1)B
) ≥ t k = 2, . . . ,m
1
2
Tr
(
[pk]B
) ≤ k k = 1, 2, . . . ,m
B  0 (36)
where [pk] is a diagonal matrix with ith diagonal entry equal
to pki, and Tr[[pk]B] is the trace of the matrix [pk]B.
Lemma 3 stems from the observation that both the objective
function (35a) and constraints (35b) are linear functions of the
entries of the positive semidefinite matrix AAT . The proof for
Lemma 3 is provided in Appendix E. The following theorem
shows that the solution of the SDP in (36) yields an optimal
privacy mechanism for the approximated PUT in (35).
Theorem 3. An optimal privacy mechanism W′ for the opti-
mization problem in (35) is
W′ = W0 + A∗[
√
w0] (37)
where W0 is the perfect privacy mechanism with rows w0,
A∗ is an optimal solution of (35) obtained from an optimal
solution B∗ = U∗[λ](U∗)T with l , rank(B∗) ≤ M of the
SDP in (36). It suffices to restrict the output alphabet size N
to l + 1, such that
A∗ = U∗Σ∗VT , (38)
where Σ∗ is an M × (l + 1) rectangular diagonal matrix
whose diagonal entries are the square roots of the l non-zero
eigenvalues λ of B∗, U∗ is a unitary matrix consisting of the
eigenvectors of B∗, and V is an (l+1)×(l+1) unitary matrix
whose the first l columns are orthogonal to
√
w0.
Proof. Let B∗ be the optimal solution of the SDP in (36)
and l , rank(B∗). We decompose B∗ via an eigenvalue
decomposition as follows:
B∗ = U∗[λ](U∗)T . (39)
Here, [λ] is an l×l diagonal matrix consisting of entries in the
eigenvalue vector λ and the columns of the M × l matrix U∗
are the l corresponding eigenvectors. Construct an l× (l+ 1)
rectangular diagonal matrix Σ∗ by adding one all-zero column
to [
√
λ]. Let N = l+1. By choosing a (l+1)×(l+1) unitary
matrix V, whose last column parallel to the (l+1)-dimensional
row vector
√
w0, we design a matrix A∗ as U∗Σ∗VT such
that A∗(A∗)T = U∗Σ∗(Σ∗)T (U∗)T = B∗. From Lemma 3,
the SDP in (36) is equivalent to the simplified (35) without
(35c). Therefore, A∗ optimizes the simplified (35). In addition,
A∗(
√
w0)
T = U∗Σ∗VT (
√
w0)
T (40)
= U∗

√
λ1 0
. . .
...√
λl 0

l×(l+1)

0
...
0
‖√w0‖

(l+1)
(41)
= U∗0 = 0 (42)
where (41) follows from the fact that the last column of the
(l+1)×(l+1) unitary matrix V is parallel to √w0, such that
the first l columns of V are orthogonal to
√
w0, and the inner
product of its last column and
√
w0 is the Euclidean norm
of
√
w0. Therefore, the A∗ constructed above is feasible and
attains the optimal value of (35).
Remark 4. Note that the size of output alphabet is at most
M + 1. For the special case of binary hypothesis testing,
we have shown in Theorem 1 that the rank of B∗ is 1 and
therefore, N = 2.
Remark 5. In the absence of any constraints in (35),
analogous to the binary hypothesis test, one would choose
min{m−1,M−1} columns of U to span the space contained
by the vectors pk−p1 for all k 6= 1. However, the constraints
in (35) depend explicitly on the vectors pk, and in fact, in (36)
at least one constraint will be tight at the optimal solution B∗.
Thus, analogous to the binary hypothesis result, we expect the
optimal mechanism to depend inversely on one or more pk.
We show that this is indeed the case for binary sources in the
following subsection.
A. m-ary Hypotheses Testing with Binary Sources
If all the m distributions pk are Bernoulli, the m−1 differ-
ence vectors pk−p1 in (35) are collinear. Thus, the minimiz-
8ing element in the objective is the one in which pk−p1 has the
minimal Euclidean norm. Without loss of generality, assume
‖p2 − p1‖ = min{‖pk − p1‖, k = 2, . . . ,m}. Therefore,
‖(p2 − p1)A‖2 = min{‖(pk − p1)A‖2, k = 2, . . . ,m}. In
this case, the E-IT approximation in (35) reduces to
max
A
1
2
‖(p2 − p1)A‖2 (43a)
s.t.
1
2
2∑
i=1
pki‖Ai‖2 ≤ k k = 1, . . . ,m (43b)
A(
√
w0)
T = 0. (43c)
We notice that (43) has the same form as (14) (the E-IT
approximation for binary hypothesis testing for the relative
entropy setting), where the number of constraints in (43b) is
m ≥ 2. Specifically, the objective and constraints have the
same structure as in (14), and thus, the results in Theorem
1 holds here. Therefore, from Theorem 2, the corresponding
optimal privacy mechanism can be expressed as (19) but with
a∗ =
p2 − p1
2
([
m∑
k=1
η∗kpk
])−1
, (44)
where η∗k ≥ 0, k = 1, . . . ,m, are the dual variables for the m
constraints in (43b).
Note that for those η∗k that are non-zero, the corre-
sponding constraints in (43b) are tight, i.e., if η∗k > 0,
1
2
∑2
i=1 pki‖Ai‖2 = k. Let K = {k : η∗k > 0, k =
1, . . . ,m}. Thus, the a∗ in (44) depends inversely on a linear
combination of the distributions indexed by K. Consequently,
the optimal mechanism for the approximated PUT depends
inversely on these distributions.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we numerically evaluate the utilities achieved
by optimal privacy mechanisms for E-IT approximations in
two scenarios: m = 2 (binary) and m = 3 (ternary)
hypothesis testing. Furthermore, for the binary hypothesis
testing scenario, we consider both the relative entropy and
Re´nyi divergence settings, while for the m = 3 scenario,
we only focus on the relative entropy setting. Our goal is to
compare the maximal utility for the E-IT approximation with
that achieved for the original PUT. To this end, we start by
choosing a privacy leakage level k = ˜  minkH(pk), for
all k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, for the E-IT approximation.
Recall that for the relative entropy setting, (37) in The-
orem 3 provides an optimal privacy mechanism W′(˜) for
the E-IT approximation problem in (35) with leakage bounds
k = ˜ for all k. Specifically, for m = 2, W′(˜) can also
be expressed as (19) in Theorem 2, where a∗ and v are the
first columns of U∗Σ∗ and V in (37), respectively. From
Corollary 1, in the high privacy regime W′(˜) in (19) is also
the optimal mechanism (for the approximated PUT) for binary
hypothesis testing in Re´nyi divergence setting.
To evaluate the performance of W′, we compare its utility
to that achieved by an optimal mechanism W∗ of the original
PUT problem (e.g., (2) for the relative entropy setting or (32)
for the Re´nyi divergence setting). For a fair comparison of
the utilities resulting from the E-IT and original PUTs, we
choose the MI leakages to be the same for both cases. Thus,
for the relative entropy setting (resp. Re´nyi divergence set-
ting), we compare the values of D(p2W′(˜)‖p1W′(˜)) (resp.
Dα(p2W
′(˜)‖p1W′(˜))) and D(p2W∗()‖p1W∗()) (resp.
Dα(p2W
∗()‖p1W∗())), where  = maxk I(pk,W′(˜)).
For the original PUT problems in (2) and (32), the number
of independent variables in W is M(M − 1) for M = N .
Even for M = 3, finding the optimal privacy mechanism
W∗() using exhaustive search techniques is computationally
prohibitive. Therefore, we restrict our numerical analysis to
binary sources, i.e., M = 2; furthermore, for numerical
tractability in computing W∗(), we assume that M = N = 2,
i.e., the output alphabet is binary.
For the E-IT approximated PUTs, since the choice of
w0 does not affect the optimal A∗, we choose w0 =
(0.5, 0.5), for which from (17) and (18), we have v =
±(√0.5,−√0.5). To capture the high privacy regime, we re-
strict ˜ ≤ 0.2 minkH(pk). For these parameters, the following
two subsections illustrate and discuss the regimes in which the
E-IT approximation is accurate.
A. Binary Hypothesis Testing
We consider four pairs of Bernoulli distributions as shown in
Table I for the two source classes (hypotheses) to evaluate the
accuracy of optimal mechanisms for the E-IT approximation
in the relative entropy and Re´nyi divergence settings. Figures
2a-2d illustrate the normalized utilities for Pairs 1- 4 in Table
I, respectively, as a function of the normalized MI leakages,
i.e., /min{H(p1), H(p2)}. In the four figures, the left and
right y-axes are for normalized utilities in the relative entropy
and Re´nyi divergence settings, respectively. Figures 2a and 2d
show that W′ and W∗ have the same utilities in the regions
highlighted by the black-dotted ellipses, in which  is smaller
than 0.5% and 0.1% of min{H(p1), H(p2)}, respectively. In
contrast, for Figs. 2b and 2c, the utilities of W′ and W∗ are
almost the same in the entire plotted range.
From Figs. 2a–2d, we deduce that for any two given distri-
butions, there is high privacy regime in which the performance
of the privacy mechanism W′ for the E-IT approximation is
almost optimal; however, the range of the regime is specific
to the distribution pairs. In particular, when both distributions
are close to the uniform or when both are far apart from the
uniform as well as each other, the set of leakage values for
which the privacy mechanism W′ works well is larger. For
the former, it can be seen that the E-IT approximations of
the relative entropy and the MI are more accurate (cf. [8,
Footnote 2]); for the latter, the individual approximation errors
“cancel out” so the overall approximation is accurate.
B. Ternary Hypothesis Testing
We numerically evaluate our results for ternary hypothesis
testing using three Bernoulli distributions, one for each of the
three hypotheses. As shown in Table II, we consider two such
triples. Figures 3a and 3b illustrate the normalized utilities for
Triples 1 and 2, respectively, as a function of the normalized
MI leakages, i.e., /mink{H(pk), k ∈ {1, 2, 3}}.
9p1 p2 close to each other close to the uniform distribution
Pair 1: (0.55, 0.45) (0.95, 0.05) No p1 Yes, p2 No
Pair 2: (0.95, 0.05) (0.05, 0.95) No p1 No, p2 No
Pair 3: (0.50, 0.50) (0.45, 0.55) Yes p1 Yes, p2 Yes
Pair 4: (0.10, 0.90) (0.05, 0.95) Yes p1 No, p2 No
TABLE I: Distribution pairs for binary hypothesis testing
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Fig. 2: The relative utilities of W′ and W∗ for the four distribution pairs in Table I
p1, p2, p3
Triple 1 (0.50, 0.50) (0.45, 0.55) (0.55, 0.45)
Triple 2 (0.15, 0.85) (0.10, 0.90) (0.20, 0.80)
TABLE II: Distribution triples for ternary hypothesis testing
Fig. 3a shows that the normalized utilities for W′ and W∗
are almost the same in the entire plotted range for Triple 1.
As shown in Fig. 3b, for Triple 2, the normalized utilities
for W′ and W∗ are close only in the region where the MI-
based leakages  are less than 0.2% of minkH(pk. As for the
binary case, here too, our plots show that the leakage range for
which the approximation is tight depends on the distributions.
For Triple 1, the good performance of the optimal mechanism
W′ exists for a larger set of MI leakages than for Triple 2,
because the three distributions in Triple 1 are close to uniform
distribution such that the E-IT approximation is accurate.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have systematically studied the problem of publishing
large datasets for binary and m-ary hypothesis testing under
privacy constraints. Our goal, broadly, is to characterize the
guarantees that can be made on the error exponents when a
MI-based constraint on the leakage of data from any source
class is bounded. Our model seeks to understand if one can
find the true probability distribution of a given dataset among a
set of possible distributions without revealing the respondents
of the data. We have shown that the optimal PUT is achieved
through a randomizing privacy mechanism which maximizes
the minimum of a set of the relative entropies between pairs
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Fig. 3: The relative utilities of W′ and W∗ for the two distribution tuples in Table II
of distributions (one for each hypothesis), while ensuring that
the MI-based leakages for all source classes are bounded.
Focusing on the high privacy regime, we have developed an
E-IT approximation of the PUT problem. For this problem,
we have shown that the optimal mechanism can be viewed
as a perturbation of a perfect privacy mechanism where the
perturbation is computed as a solution to a convex optimization
problem. As is expected of statistical metrics such as relative
entropy and MI, our results reveal that the randomizing mech-
anism perturbs the statistical outliers the most for each source
class. Such a mechanism ensures both utility (predominantly
provided by the non-outliers) while preserving privacy of those
most vulnerable to inference attacks.
Future work includes developing optimal mechanisms and
PUTs for all possible leakage levels. Comparison with other
privacy metrics is also of interest.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Proof. Consider the high privacy regime in which 0 ≤ k 
min{H(pk), k ∈ {1, ..,m}}, k ∈ {1, ..,m}. In this regime,
W can be written as a perturbation of W0 via
W = W0 + Θ (45)
where W0 is a mechanism achieving perfect privacy with all
rows equal to w0, where w0 is chosen such that its entries
w0j 6= 0,∀j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, and Θ is a matrix with
N∑
j=1
Θij = 0, ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . ,M} (46)
|Θij | ≤ ρw0j ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, j ∈ {1, . . . , N}. (47)
where the radius of the neighborhood around w0 is ρ∈ [0, 1).
Note that (46) is derived from the row stochasticity of
W and W0. The constraint in (47) captures the fact that
approximating about a perfect privacy achieving mechanism
requires restricting the entries of the perturbation matrix Θ to
be within a fraction ρ of w0.
The perturbation modeled in (45)-(47) implies that every
row in W and the output distribution p1W and pkW for all
k ∈ {2, . . . ,m} are in a neighborhood about w0 given by∣∣Wij − w0j∣∣ ≤ ρw0j , (48a)∣∣(pkW)j − w0j∣∣ ≤ ρw0j , for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} (48b)
for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,M} and j ∈ {1, . . . , N}. In this
neighborhood, we can approximate the relative entropy
D(pkW‖p1W) using a Taylor series around W0 as
D(pkW‖p1W) = 1
2
N∑
j=1
(∑M
i=1 pkiΘij −
∑M
i=1 p1iΘij
)2∑M
i=1 pkiWij
+ o
(∥∥(pk − p1)Θ[(pkW)− 12 ]∥∥2∞)
(49)
≈ 1
2
∥∥∥(pk − p1)Θ[(pkW)− 12 ]∥∥∥2 (50)
≈ 1
2
∥∥(pk − p1)Θ[(w0)− 12 ]∥∥2 (51)
where (50) results from approximating the relative entropy by
the χ2-divergence [29, Theorem 4.1], and (51) results from
applying the neighborhood condition in (48b).
Similarly, one can approximate the MI between the source
class k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and its output as
I(pk,W) =
1
2
M∑
i=1
pki
( N∑
j=1
(
Wij −
∑M
i=1 pkiWij
)2
Wij
+ o
(∥∥(Wi − pkW)[(Wi)− 12 ]∥∥2∞)) (52)
≈ 1
2
M∑
i=1
pki
∥∥∥(Wi − pkW)[(Wi)− 12 ]∥∥∥2 (53)
≈ 1
2
M∑
i=1
pki
∥∥(w0+Θi−pkW)[(w0)− 12 ]∥∥2 (54)
≈ 1
2
M∑
i=1
pki
∥∥Θi[(w0)− 12 ]∥∥2, (55)
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where Wi and Θi are the ith rows of W and Θ, respectively.
Let A be a matrix with entries
Aij =
Θij√
w0j
, i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, (56)
From (46), A(
√
w0)
T = 0, where
√
w0 is the vector whose
entries are the square root of the entries of w0. Thus, the
approximations in (9) and (10) lead to (11) and (12) resp.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof. Consider the following optimization problem obtained
from (14) without the constraint A(
√
w0)
T = 0:
max
A
M∑
i,j=1
1
2
(p2 − p1)i(p2 − p1)jAiATj
s.t.
1
2
M∑
i=1
pkiAiA
T
i ≤ k k = 1, 2
(57)
Let ∆i , (p1 − p2)i, i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}. Furthermore, let a be
a row vector with entries ai for all i that |ai| is the Euclidean
norm of the ith row Ai of A. Let Ω denote the symmetric
matrix of the cosines of angles between the rows of A, such
that its entries Ωij , cos∠(Ai,Aj), i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, with
|Ωij | ≤ 1 for i 6= j and Ωij = 1 for i = j. Rewriting (57)
with these variables, we have
max
a,Ω
M∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
1
2
∆i∆j |ai‖aj |Ωij
s.t. Ωii = 1
|Ωij | ≤ 1 i 6= j ∈ {1, . . . ,M}
1
2
M∑
i=1
pkia
2
i ≤ k, k = 1, 2
(58)
Consider first the optimization over Ω. Since the objective is
linear in Ω and the feasible region of Ω is a hypercube, (58)
is a linear program whose optimal solution is at one of the
extreme points of the hypercube [32, Theorem 3.5.3], i.e., the
optimal solution Ω∗ has entries |Ω∗i,j | = 1 for all i, j. Thus, all
the rows of an A maximizing (57) are parallel, and therefore,
the optimal solution A∗ of (57) is a rank-1 matrix.
In addition, from the objective function in (58), if the signs
of ∆1∆i and ∆1∆j are known for any i, j ∈ {2, . . . ,M}, the
sign of ∆i∆j can be determined. Furthermore, maximizing the
objective requires that Ωij has the same sign as its coefficient
∆i∆j . Therefore, Ω∗ij = Ω
∗
1iΩ
∗
1j for all i, j ∈ {2, . . . ,M}, i.e.,
Ω∗ has only M − 1 independent entries Ω∗1j , j ∈ {2, . . . ,M}
with Ω∗ii = 1 for all i.
Thus, we see that the optimization in (58) depends on only
M values of |ai|, i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, and M − 1 signs of Ω∗1i,
i ∈ {2, . . . ,M}. Let v denote a unit norm vector with no zero
entry, and θ∗i for all i represent the direction of i
th row of A
with respect to v, such that Ω∗ij = θ
∗
i θ
∗
j , and the i
th row of
A can be written as Ai = θ∗i |ai|v = aiv. The optimization
in (58) can now be written as a function of the vector a as
max
a
M∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
1
2
(p2 − p1)i(p2 − p1)jaiaj
s.t.
1
2
M∑
i=1
pkia
2
i ≤ k, k = 1, 2.
(59)
The optimal solution A∗ of (57) is related to a∗ optimiz-
ing (59) as follows:
A∗ = (a∗)Tv. (60)
The optimal solution in (59) yields both the magnitude and
sign of ai for all i. Also, v in (60) can be chosen to satisfy
A∗(
√
w0)
T = (a∗)Tv(
√
w0)
T = 0. (61)
Thus, by using (60) and (61) and solving for a∗ in (15), we
obtain A∗ in (14) as desired. For any w0 ∈ RN , the condition
N = 2 is sufficient to obtain a v satisfying v(
√
w0)
T =
0, i.e., A∗(
√
w0)
T = 0. Therefore, binary output alphabets
suffices.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
To prove Theorem 2, we use Theorem 1 and two lemmas.
The problem in (15) maximizes a convex function over a
convex set, and thus, it is not a convex program. However, we
show how the problem can be reduced to a convex program
and we also obtain a closed-form solution.
Lemma 4. The following convex program completely deter-
mines the solutions of (15),
max
a
1
2
λpa(vp)
T
s.t.
1
2
a
[
pk
]
aT ≤ k, k = 1, 2
(62)
such that the optimal solutions of (15) are ±a∗ where a∗ is
the optimal solution of (62).
Proof. For the optimization problem in (15), the matrix (p2−
p1)
T (p2 − p1) is rank-1 with eigenvalue λp = ‖p2 − p1‖2
and eigenvector vp = p2−p1‖p2−p1‖ . Thus, we have
1
2
a(p2 − p1)T (p2 − p1)aT = 1
2
λp(a(vp)
T )2, (63)
leading to the following optimization problem
max
a
1
2
λp(a(vp)
T )2
s.t.
1
2
a
[
pk
]
aT ≤ k, k = 1, 2.
(64)
In (62) and (64), the two objectives depend on a in the same
manner and their constraint functions are the same. Hence the
optimal solution a∗ of (62) optimizes (64). Since the objective
and constraint functions of (64) are even, −a∗ is feasible and
yields the optimal value, i.e, −a∗ is also optimal for (64).
The optimal solution a∗ of (62) can be evaluated by
observing that at a∗, either one or both constraints are active.
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The following lemma summarizes the optimal solution of (62).
From Lemma 4, one can then obtain the optimal solution (15).
Lemma 5. The optimal solutions of (15) are given by:
1) if only the first constraint is active, i.e., 1 and 2 satisfy
(20), the optimal solution α∗ is (21);
2) if only the second constraint is active, i.e., 1 and 2
satisfy (22), the optimal solution α∗ is (23);
3) when both constraints are active, the optimal solution
α∗ is (24) with η∗1 , η
∗
2 > 0 satisfying (25) and (26).
Proof. From Lemma 4, to find the optimal solutions of (15),
it suffices to find the optimal solution to (62). In (62), the
objective function is linear in a. Since p1 and p2 are interior
points of probability simplex, both
[
p1
]
and
[
p2
]
are positive
definite, i.e., the two constraint functions are convex in a.
Thus, this is a convex program. In addition, a = 0 strictly
satisfies the two constraints for positive 1 and 2, which
means that (62) satisfies Slater’s condition [9, Sec. 5.2.3].
Therefore, the convex program has zero duality gap, and the
optimal solutions are given by the following Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker (KKT) conditions [9, Sec. 5.5.3]:
∇{f0(a∗)+η∗1(1−f1(a∗))+η∗2(2−f2(a∗))}=0 (65a)
η∗1
(
1 − f1(a∗)
)
= 0 (65b)
η∗2
(
2 − f2(a∗)
)
= 0 (65c)
f1(a
∗) ≤ 1 (65d)
f2(a
∗) ≤ 2 (65e)
η∗1 ≥ 0 (65f)
η∗2 ≥ 0. (65g)
where f0, f1, and f2 represent the objective and two constraint
functions of (62), respectively, a∗ is the optimal solution
of (62), and η∗1 and η
∗
2 are the optimal solutions of the dual
problem of (62). From (65a), we have
a∗ =
λp
2
vp
(
η∗1
[
p1
]
+ η∗2
[
p2
])−1
. (66)
When η∗1 > 0 and η
∗
2 = 0, i.e., the first constraint is active,
the optimal solution a∗ of (62) is
a∗ =
λp
2
vp
[
(η∗1p1)
−1], (67)
such that from (65b),
η∗1 =
√
(λp)2(vp)T
[
(p1)−1
]
vp
81
. (68)
Substituting η∗1 from (68) in (67), we obtain
a∗ =
√
21
vp
[
(p1)−1
]
(vp)T
vp
[
(p1)
−1] (69)
In addition, for η∗2 = 0, (65e) is a strict inequality if and only
if 1 and 2 satisfy (20).
When η∗1 = 0 and η
∗
2 > 0, with the same deduction based
on (65c) and (66), the optimal solution a∗ is
a∗ =
√
22
vp
[
(p2)−1
]
(vp)T
vp
[
(p2)
−1]. (70)
and (65d) is a strict inequality if and only if 1 and 2
satisfy (22).
When η∗1 > 0 and η
∗
2 > 0, the optimal solution a
∗ is given
by (66). From (65b) and (65c), we have f1(a∗) = 1 and
f2(a
∗) = 2, such that η∗1 and η
∗
2 satisfy (25) and (26).
Finally, since (66), (69) and (70) yield a∗ for (62), the
optimal solutions for (15) are obtained by considering both
solutions ±a∗ as proved in Lemma 4.
The proof of Theorem 2 follows directly from Theorem 1,
Lemma 4 and Lemma 5 as follows.
Proof. The optimal privacy mechanism W′ is a perturbation
of W0 as W′ = W0 + A∗
[√
w0
]
, where A∗ optimizes (14).
From Theorem 1, A∗ is given by A∗ = (a∗)Tv, where v is a
unit norm M -dimensional vector that is orthogonal to
√
w0,
and a∗ is the optimal solution of (15) as presented in Lemma 5.
Therefore, the optimal privacy mechanism W′ is (19).
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Proof. From [33, Theorem 8], for α ∈ (0, 1) the order-α
Hellinger divergence3 Hα and the relative entropy satisfy
κα(β2) ≤ D(p2‖p1)Hα(p2‖p1) ≤ κα(β
−1
1 ). (71)
Here, κα is a continuous function defined as
κα(t) =

(1−α)t log t
1−tα+αt−α t ∈ (0, 1) ∪ (1,∞)
α−1 log e t = 1
log e t = 0
, (72)
and β1 and β2, which depend on p1 and p2, are defined as
β1 = exp
(
− log max
i
p2i
p1i
)
=
(
max
i
p2i
p1i
)log 1e
(73)
β2 = exp
(
− log max
i
p1i
p2i
)
=
(
max
i
p1i
p2i
)log 1e
. (74)
Assuming p1 6= p2, we know that maxi p1ip2i ,maxi
p2i
p1i
> 1.
Since log 1e < 0, β1, β2 < 1. However, it is also clear that
p2 → p1 =⇒ βj → 1, ∀ j = 1, 2. (75)
Since κα is continuous and κα(1) = α−1 log e, from (75),
p2 → p1 =⇒ κα(β2)→ log e
α
, κα(β
−1
1 )→
log e
α
. (76)
Consequently, from (71),
p2 → p1 =⇒ D(p2‖p1)Hα(p2‖p1) →
log e
α
. (77)
In addition, from [33], we know that the order-α Re´nyi
divergence and the order-α Hellinger divergence admit the
following relationship for α ∈ (0, 1) ∪ (1,∞):
Dα(p2‖p1) = 1
α− 1 log
(
1 + (α− 1)Hα(p2‖p1)
)
(78)
The proof of (33) is completed by uniting (77) and (78).
3The the order-α Hellinger divergence Hα(p‖q) = Dfα (p‖q) where
Df (p‖q) =
∑
i qif
( pi
qi
)
is the f -divergence and fα(t) = t
α−1
α−1 .
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APPENDIX E
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Proof. We first replace the matrix variable A of (35) by
a positive semi-definite symmetric matrix B = AAT . The
objective function can thus be rewritten as
1
2
‖(pk − p1)A‖2 = 1
2
(pk − p1)B(pk − p1)T (79)
=
1
2
Tr
(
(pk − p1)T (pk − p1)B
)
(80)
for k ∈ {2, . . . ,m}. For k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} the constraint
functions are
1
2
M∑
i=1
pki‖Ai‖2 = 1
2
M∑
i=1
pkiBii =
1
2
Tr
(
[pk]B
)
(81)
Using an auxiliary scalar variable t to represent a common
lower bound of the terms 12‖(pk − p1)A‖2 in the objective
function, the problem (35) without the constraint (35c) can be
seen to be equivalent to (36).
Define the inner product between matrices X and Y as
X • Y , ∑Mi=1∑Mj=1XijY ij = Tr(XTY). Then, the
optimization problem in (36) can be rewritten as
−min
B,t
− t
s.t.
[−t 0
0T 12Pk
]
•
[
1 0
0T B
]
≥ 0 ∀ k ∈ {2, . . . ,m}[
k 0
0T −[pk]
]
•
[
1 0
0T B
]
≥ 0 ∀ k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}[
1 0
0 B
]
 0 (82)
where the M ×M matrix Pk , (pk − p1)T (pk − p1).
Since Pk (for k ∈ {2, . . . ,m}) and [pk] (for k ∈
{1, . . . ,m}) are symmetric positive semi-definite matrices, by
referring to [34, Section 8.2], we know that (82) is an SDP.
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